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Abstract
In this paper the impact of a policy change on the investment behavior of the firm is
studied in an asymmetric information setting. The policy change occurs when a stochastic
process describing the state of the economic environment reaches a certain trigger. Asym-
metric information is modeled here by imposing that the firm does not know this trigger
but only its probability distribution. Consequently, both the firm’s conjecture concerning
the trigger value as well as the precision of this conjecture serve as input parameters. We
derive the optimal investment rule maximizing the value of the firm. We show that the
impact of trigger value uncertainty is non-monotonic: the investment threshold decreases
with the trigger value uncertainty for low levels of uncertainty, while the reverse is true
for high uncertainty levels. Moreover, we provide results concerning the valuation of the
firm’s investment opportunity. Finally, based on the firm’s value-maximizing behavior,
policy implications for the authority are presented.
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1 Introduction
Corporate investment opportunities may be represented as a set of (real) options to
acquire productive assets. In the literature it is widely assumed that the present values of
cash flows generated by these assets are uncertain and that their evolution can be described
by a stochastic process. Consequently, identification of the optimal exercise strategies for real
options plays a crucial role in capital budgeting and in the maximization of a firm’s value.
So far, the real options literature provides relatively little insight into the impact of
structural changes of the economic environment on the investment decisions of a firm. The
existing papers (excellent surveys of those are provided in Dixit and Pindyck, 1996, Lander
and Pinches, 1998, and Schwartz and Trigeorgis, 2001) mainly consider continuous changes
in the values of relevant variables. Most of the time, this results in the assumption that the
entire uncertainty in the economy can be described by a geometric Brownian motion.
In case of structural changes it is more realistic to model an economic variable as a
process that makes infrequent but discrete jumps.
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In such cases use is made of a Poisson
(jump) process. However, within such a framework the implicit assumption is made that the
firm has virtually no information about the mechanisms governing the shocks in the economy.
It is natural to assume that the firm can to some extent assess the precision of its conjecture
concerning the moment of change, i.e. that it knows the variance of the estimate of timing
of the future event. A Poisson based approach does not allow for including this type of
uncertainty in the analysis since it entails a single parameter characterizing the arrival rate
of the jump. Consequently, such a modelling approach lacks degrees of freedom necessary for
capturing both the expectation and the precision of this expectation.
We propose a method to model the impact of a policy change on the investment
strategy of the firm that takes into account the precision of information concerning the
policy change possessed by the firm while making the investment decision. In our approach
the expectation of the moment of the change as well as its variance serve as input parameters.
We model the policy change as being triggered by a sufficiently high realization of a stochastic
process related to the value of the investment opportunity. The policy change results in an
upward jump in the (net) investment cost. The firm is not aware of the exact value of the
trigger but it knows the probability distribution underlying the trigger. Taking into account
consistent authority behavior, the firm knows that a jump will not occur as long as the
current value of the variable remains below the maximum that this variable has attained in
the past. When the underlying variable reaches a new maximum and still the jump does not
occur, the firm updates its conjecture about the value of the barrier.
An interesting example of a structural change in the economy has been provided by
Hassett and Metcalf (1999), who analyze how an expected reduction in the investment tax
1
For instance, recent tax debates both in the US and across Europe constitute a significant source of
uncertainty associated with discountinuous changes in the economic environment.
2
credit influences capital investment behavior.
2
In their setting a Poisson process describes
the changes in the tax regime that affect the value of the investment opportunity. The
framework of our paper coincides with Hassett and Metcalf (1999) in the sense that also here
the firm expects a policy change but it does not know the exact moment at which it will
occur. However, the firm typically expects the reduction to be imposed when the economy is
booming and an active pro-investment policy is no longer needed or desired. Our framework
takes this aspect into account, and this is exactly how Hassett and Metcalf (1999) is extended.
Applying the Poisson based methodology is equivalent to assuming that it is time itself and
not the state of economic environment that governs the change. As we argue, the moment
of the reduction depends on the state of the economy. This is in contrast with the models
based on the Poisson process where the probability of the change is constant over time.
3,4
Consequently, our objective is to determine the optimal timing of an irreversible
investment when the investment cost is subject to change and the firm has incomplete in-
formation about the moment of the change. It is clear that the value of the investment
opportunity drops to zero at the moment that the investment cost jumps to infinity. How-
ever, we consider a situation where the cost of investment can be finite after the occurrence
of an upward jump. In this respect this work generalizes Berrada (1999), Schwartz and Moon
(2000), and Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003), in which the value of the project drops to zero
at the unknown point of time.
Our main results are the following. An equation is derived that implicitly determines
the value of the project at which the firm is indifferent between investing and refraining from
investment. This value is the optimal investment threshold and it is shown that this threshold
is decreasing in the hazard rate of the cost-increase trigger. We show that for a given value of
the project, the hazard rate first increases and then decreases with trigger value uncertainty.
It turns out that this non-monotonic relationship is crucial for our main finding. This main
finding is that the investment threshold decreases with the trigger value uncertainty when
the uncertainty is low, while it increases with uncertainty for high uncertainty levels. The
implication is that an intermediate uncertainty level exists at which the threshold value is
2
Other contributions concerning the impact of policy risk on irreversible investment include Altug et al.
(2001), and Panteghini and Scarpa (2003).
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Hassett and Metcalf (1999) try to correct this by letting the arrival rate depend on the output price.
But still it is then possible that an investment subsidy is reduced for low output prices, while the subsidy
was maintained under high output prices. This kind of inconsistency in the authority’s behavior is no longer
possible under our approach.
4
There are other economic situations in which it is realistic to impose a certain relationship between the
occurrence of the shock and the state of the economy. A foreign direct investment decision to purchase a
privatized enterprise where the local government may increase the offering price after the performance of the
enterprise improves, can also be perceived as an option with an embedded risk of an increase in the strike price.
A non-exclusive investment opportunity for which a competitive bid can be expected can serve as another
example.
3
lowest, i.e. the firm will invest at the earliest instance exactly in this situation. Hence, for a
policy maker interested in accelerating investment, an optimal (strictly positive) level of the
trigger value uncertainty can be identified which is the level corresponding to the minimal
investment threshold. Furthermore, we show that the relationship between the value of the
investment opportunity and policy uncertainty is non-monotonic.
In Section 2 we present the model of investment with the jump in the investment
cost that results from a policy change. Section 3 provides the major results and Section 4
contains a numerical valuation of the investment opportunity and analyzes the probability
of investment before the policy change is imposed. In Section 5 we present the implications
of our model for the authority that considers an investment tax credit policy change, and
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
It is assumed that the value of the investment project follows a geometric Brownian
motion
dV (t) = αV (t)dt+ σV (t) dw (t) , (1)
where parameter α denotes the deterministic drift parameter, σ is the instantaneous standard
deviation, and dw is the increment of a Wiener process. The riskless rate is r and it holds that
α < r. The firm is risk-neutral and maximizes the value of the investment option, F (V ). If
the value of the investment project reaches a critical level, a change in the value of a certain
policy instrument is imposed and, as a result, an effective increase in the investment cost
occurs.
5
This instrument can be interpreted, among others, as a reduction in the investment
tax credit, an increase in the cost of capital via lending rates or an increase in the offering
price for a privatized enterprise.
We denote by V
∗
such a realization of the process for which the new policy is im-










is assumed to be
deterministic.
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The firm does not know the value of V
∗
but knows only its cumulative den-
sity function, Ψ(V
∗





Consequently, if the investment cost has not increased by time τ , while
̂
V is the highest




If, instead, a downward change in investment cost is considered, the same solution methodology can be
applied as in the remainder of the paper. Consequently, a unique realization of the underlying process has to
be found for which the marginal cost of waiting beyond the optimal investment threshold equals the benefit
of waiting associated with the expected decrease in the investment cost.
6
An extension for the stochastic cost would entail replacing I
h






















is the cumulative distribution function of the stochastic investment
cost and A is the support of the distribution. Parameter β is defined in the main text.
7
The truncation level is irrelevant as long as it falls into the interval (0, V (0)).
4
for all t ≤ u. Hence, the probability of the jump in the investment cost is a function of V
alone.

















































/ (β − 1)) is the optimal investment threshold corresponding to the cost I
h
.
Assumption (2) states that in the average case it is not optimal to wait with investing until
the upward change in cost occurs and that without the expected policy change, the firm
would invest optimally at the level of V which exceeds µ.
2.1 Value of the Investment Opportunity
Since the value of the project that triggers the increase in the investment cost is not
known beforehand, two scenarios are possible. In the first scenario the investment occurs
before the change in the investment cost, and in the second scenario the investment takes place
after the upward change. Consequently, the value of the investment opportunity reflecting













































V ) is the conditional (on the highest realization of V ,
̂
V ) probability that the




denote the first passage time corresponding to the optimal investment threshold at the low
and at the high cost, respectively. After rearranging and including these expectations, we























































is the optimal investment threshold in case the investment takes place before the change
in cost, and
̂









, given that the shock has not occurred for V smaller than
̂
V . Therefore, equation
(5) implies that the value of the investment opportunity is equal to the weighted average of





, respectively, given that the investment is made optimally (at V
s





if the upward change has already occurred).
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The value of the investment opportunity depends on the highest realization of the
process,
̂
V . A higher
̂
V (thus a one closer to V
s
) implies a lower probability of the cost-




) and, as a consequence, a higher probability of
making the investment at the lower cost, I
l
. In order to calculate the value of the investment
opportunity, we first need to establish the value of V
s
by solving the maximization problem.
2.2 Optimal Investment Threshold
The optimal investment threshold, V
s
, is found by maximizing the value of the investment
opportunity (cf. the RHS of equation (5)).
Proposition 1 Investment is made optimally at V
s



































Proof. See Appendix A.
In our case, the hazard rate has the following interpretation. The probability of the
upward change in the investment cost occurring during the nearest increment of the value
of the project, dV , (given that the cost-increase has not occurred by now) is equal to the
appropriate hazard rate multiplied by the size of the value increment, i.e. to h(V ; ·)dV .
8
It is worth pointing out that for I
h






















































which is the formula obtained by McDonald and Siegel (1986).
6
3 Solution Characteristics
In this section we analyze how the optimal threshold is affected by changes in the pa-
rameters characterizing the dynamics of the project value. In Appendix B we prove that the
optimal investment threshold, V
s
, decreases both in I
h
, and in β, and it increases in I
l
. The
former result is intuitive since a threat of a higher future investment cost leads the firm to
accept the investment project sooner. The latter two results are consistent with the standard
real option theory.
The optimal investment rule depends also on the firm’s conjecture about the proba-
bility distribution underlying the expected policy change.
3.1 Hazard Rate
The hazard rate of the arrival of the cost-increase trigger is one of the basic inputs for
calculating the optimal investment threshold. From (8) the following result can be obtained.
Proposition 2 The optimal investment threshold is decreasing in the hazard rate of the cost-











Proof. See Appendix A.
This result implies that an increasing incremental probability of the jump leads to an
earlier optimal exercise. The intuition is that an increasing probability of a partial deteriora-
tion of the investment opportunity after a small appreciation in the project value decreases
the value of waiting. Proposition 2 has a useful implication. A change in a model parameter
that affects the hazard rate in one direction, shifts the optimal investment threshold in the
opposite side. Consequently, we are able to establish how the investment threshold is affected
by changes in the parameters of the distribution function underlying the occurrence of the
jump.
3.2 Trigger Value Uncertainty
In order to analyze how the optimal investment threshold is affected by the uncertainty
of the cost-increase trigger, we only need to establish the sign of the relationship between
the hazard rate and this uncertainty. The changes in trigger-value uncertainty are analyzed
by applying a mean-preserving spread (see Rotschild and Stiglitz, 1970), which is equivalent
to changing the variance of the underlying probability distribution, while keeping the mean
fixed.
7
If the cost-increase trigger, V
∗
, is known with certainty, the investment is made
optimally (by assumption (2)) at an infinitesimal instant before V
∗
is reached. At this point,
the hazard rate is zero so there is no risk that the cost increases before this trigger is reached.
As the uncertainty marginally increases, the hazard rate, for any V ∈ [V (0) , µ), first increases
and then decreases in the mean-preserving spread.
9
This is a direct consequence of the fact
that the probability mass spreads out as uncertainty increases. When uncertainty is low,
the probability mass goes up with uncertainty for any V ∈ [V (0) , µ) and, for sufficiently
large uncertainty, this probability mass is negatively related to uncertainty. It turns out that
the non-monotonicity feature is the driving force of the results obtained in this paper. An
example is shown in Figure 1.
























Figure 1: The relationship between the hazard rate and standard deviation calculated for a density
function with mean 150. Hazard rates are plotted for V = 100, 120 and 140.
It also holds that for each degree of the trigger value uncertainty, such a value of
V < µ, say
˜
V , exists such that for V ∈ [V (0) ,
˜
V ) the hazard rate increases, and for V ∈ (
˜
V , µ)
decreases, in this uncertainty. This form of the relationship between the hazard rate and the
uncertainty implies (via Proposition 2) that V
s
decreases in the uncertainty if it falls into the
interval [V (0) ,
˜
V ) and increases outside this interval
Consequently, in order to determine the sign of the effect of uncertainty on V
s
, we




V . Recall that ω is the standard
deviation of the density function underlying the cost-increase trigger. Since the expression
for V
s
is already known (see (8)), all we have to calculate is
˜
V as a function of ω, such that,
9
It can be shown that this property holds also for other frequently used density functions, such as uniform,
exponential and Pareto.
8











It can be shown that
˜
V decreases with uncertainty.
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Consequently, for a relatively low degree




V (< µ). Since for V <
˜
V the hazard rate increases in
ω, V
s







V , the hazard rate at V
s
decreases in ω and the optimal threshold begins to
increase. This implies that the optimal investment threshold attains its minimum for ω = ω
e
.
Now, we are able to formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 3 There exists a non-monotonic relationship between the optimal investment
threshold and the trigger value uncertainty. At a low degree of uncertainty, the marginal
increase in uncertainty leads to an earlier optimal investment. The reverse is true for a high
degree of uncertainty. There exists a unique ω
e









the areas of low and high uncertainty levels.
Proof. See Appendix A.
At low levels of uncertainty concerning the policy change the firm responds to an
increase of this uncertainty by investing earlier (i.e. at a lower V ). This is because the
probability of an earlier implementation of the policy change increases. However, when this
uncertainty becomes sufficiently high, the firm is more willing to ignore the information about
the expected change since the quality of this information has deteriorated too much. The
marginal impacts of a higher probability of an early change and of the increased ”noisiness”
of the firm’s conjecture offset exactly at the level of uncertainty equal to ω
e
.
Figures 2 and 3 show the relationship between the uncertainty, ω, and the optimal
investment threshold. In Figure 2 it can be seen that the optimal investment threshold is
first decreasing and then increasing in the uncertainty concerning the value of the trigger.




V (ω). The hazard rate increases in ω
in the area located to the south-west from
˜
V (ω) and decreases in the north-eastern region.
The opposite holds for V
s
. Moreover, the optimal threshold is higher if the expected change
in the investment cost is smaller.
In Figure 3 it can be noticed that the point,
˜
V , at which the derivative of the hazard





optimal threshold also decreases (see the location of V
L
s







V . After a further increase in the uncertainty,
˜




V (ω) cannot be written explicitly, its value and the negative dependence on ω can be easily
established numerically.
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Figure 2: The relationship between the uncertainty, ω, and the optimal investment threshold, V
s
, for
different magnitudes of the high investment cost (I
h
= 120, 150 and 200). The values are calculated
for a density function with mean 150. The original investment cost I
l









). The parameters of the underlying

























Figure 3: The relationship between V and the derivative of the hazard rate with respect to the










uncertainty levels equal to, higher than, and lower than the level of uncertainty triggering the earliest
investment, respectively. V
l





starts to increase (see V
H
s
). For a sufficiently high degree of uncertainty V
s
tends to




/ (β − 1)).
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4 Valuation and Investment Probability
The policy change uncertainty has direct implications for the value of the investment
opportunity and the probability that the investment is made before the change in the invest-
ment cost occurs. In Table 1 we provide a numerical illustration made under the assumption
that the investment cost still equals I
l
at V (0).











100 50 25 10 5
110 61.54 66.65 70.58 71.24 66.00
0.68 0.55 0.44 0.42 0.53
125 55.82 57.11 56.94 53.25 48.66
0.75 0.68 0.66 0.74 0.88
150 50.93 50.01 48.28 46.28 45.27
0.80 0.78 0.80 0.87 0.95
200 46.69 44.70 42.93 43.01 43.92
0.85 0.86 0.90 0.93 0.97
500 42.16 40.51 40.00 40.86 42.98
0.91 0.96 1.00 0.97 0.98
∞ 40.62 40.00 40.00 40.30 42.66
0.94 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.97
V
l
= 200 α = 0.02 σ = 0.1 r = 0.05
Table 1. The values of the investment opportunity and probabilities of investing at I
l
for the following
parameter values: investment cost before the jump I
l
= 100, investment cost after the jump ranging
from 110 to infinity, standard deviation of the probability distribution underlying the policy change
ranging from 5 to 100. The initial value of the process equals V (0) =
̂
V = 140.
Table 1 confirms that the magnitude of the change in the investment cost results
in i) deteriorating the value of the investment opportunity, and ii) an increased probability
of investing before the shock occurs (which is a direct consequence of the lower optimal
threshold).
An interesting observation can be made upon analyzing the relationship between the
trigger-value uncertainty and the value of the investment opportunity. The non-monotonicity
11









of this relationship results from the interaction of two opposite effects. First, increasing the
variance, ω
2
, implies lower quality of the firm’s information about the moment of the policy
change. This factor affects the value of the investment opportunity negatively. On the other
hand, higher uncertainty reduces the probability mass in the interval [V (0) , V
s
]. This implies
that the probability of survival on the interval [V (0) , V
s
] becomes higher, which enhances the
value of the investment opportunity.
12
It appears that in situations where the magnitude of
the change in the investment cost is small, the value of the project is highest for a moderate
precision of the conjecture about the timing of the change. Conversely, if the investment
opportunity is to deteriorate completely upon the occurrence of the shock, the value of the
project is most likely to be equal to its static NPV, i.e. the value of the project minus
investment cost, for a moderate precision of the conjecture.
The non-monotonicity of the value of investment opportunity in the variance of the
trigger V
∗
does not contradict the standard (real) option theory according to which the
relationship between the option value and risk is positive. Option theory describes the re-
lationship between the volatility of the underlying asset (σ) and the option value. Here, we
analyze the impact of the uncertainty concerning the strike price of the option (ω) on its value,
and option theory does not yield any predictions concerning the sign of this relationship.
5 Implications for the Investment Credit Tax Policy Change
To illustrate the design of a credit tax policy change that triggers the earliest investment,
we construct the following numerical example. The values of the basic model parameters are
as follows: r = 0.05, α = 0.02, and σ = 0.125. Consider a continuum of firms with investment
cost I
l
distributed uniformly over the interval [65, 105]. The initial value of the project V (0)
is 130. First, V
∗
is assumed to be known and equal to 147.5. Then the average expected




as a policy instrument and lowering it to 140 results
in the average expected time to invest being shortened to 6.08 years. A further decrease in
V
∗
would result in increasing the average expected time to invest, since firms with I
l
close
to 105 would be better off by postponing their investment until their V
h
(since the first part
of condition (2) would be violated for them). For these firms the project value is too small
to invest before the policy change occurs.
12
The positive impact on the value of the investment opportunity results from the fact that conditional on
V
∗
> V (0) the cumulative density function of V
∗
is decreasing in ω for sufficiently large ω. This is equivalent,
by definition, to the increase of the value of the conditional survival function.
13
The expected time E [T
∗
















For a derivation of the probability distribution of the first passage time see Harrison (1985) for a formal
exposition and Dixit (1993) for a heuristic approach.
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Alternatively, the authority can leave V
∗
at the initial level of 147.5 and introduce
uncertainty about its value. It holds that for ω = 7, the optimal investment threshold V
s
of
the firm with the highest investment cost (I
l
= 105) is approximately equal to V
∗
. Moreover,
for ω = 7 and I
l
= 105, the threshold V
s
is increasing in ω (i.e. for I
l
= 105 it holds that
ω = 7 > ω
e
; cf. also Figures 1 and 2). Consequently, a further increase in ω would result
in the situation where firms with the highest investment cost invest after the occurrence of
policy change, which would increase the average expected time to invest. This implies that
ω = 7 remains the level of uncertainty at which the average expected time to invest is lowest
and equal to 4.95 years. Therefore, comparing the two situations allows for the conclusion
that abstaining from using uncertainty as a policy instrument results in the average expected
time to invest being almost 23% higher than in the case where uncertainty is used optimally.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we consider an investment opportunity of a firm in a situation where the
investment cost is irreversible and subject to an increase resulting from a policy change. The
value of the cost-increase trigger is unknown to the firm. Instead, the firm has information
about the probability distribution characterizing the authority’s policy. Furthermore, it is
taken into account that a policy change occurs under certain economic conditions.
We show that the threat of a policy change resulting in a higher investment cost
leads to a reduction in the option value of waiting. Consequently, the firm invests earlier
than in the case of a constant investment cost. The optimal investment threshold decreases
in the magnitude of the change in investment cost and increases in market volatility (the
latter result also holds in the standard real option framework). Moreover, we show that
the value of the investment opportunity is non-monotonic in the magnitude of policy change
uncertainty.
Our main result is that the impact of trigger value uncertainty on the optimal invest-
ment threshold is non-monotonic. If the uncertainty is sufficiently low, then the investment
threshold is negatively related to the trigger value uncertainty. However, a rise in the un-
certainty beyond a certain critical point reverses this relationship and leads to an increase of
the optimal investment threshold. We illustrate our results with an example of the optimal
design of the authority’s policy change, where the authority’s aim is to accelerate invest-
ment undertaken by firms. It is shown that the shortest average expected time to invest is
associated with a strictly positive level of the policy change uncertainty.
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A Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. The implicit solution for the optimal investment threshold is
found by calculating the first order condition of (5). By differentiating (5) with respect to
V
s



































































































































































what in a straightforward way leads to (8).
In order to prove that (8) is the expression for the maximal value of the project, we
























































































− (β − 1). (A.2)























The sign of the first component can be determined by notifying that the lower bound of
V
s
, denoted by V
s







































) are always positive and,
on the basis of assumption (2) implying that V
s
< µ, the hazard rate increases in V .
Proof of Proposition 2. By differentiating (B.1) with respect to the hazard rate,




































we directly obtain the sign of (9).
Proof of Proposition 3. Using the result of Proposition 2 about the inverse relation-
ship between the hazard rate and the optimal investment threshold, we still have to prove
















is positive for ω ∈ (0, ω
∗
) and negative for ω ∈ (ω
∗
,∞) for any V smaller than the mean µ.














































































u ≡ x− µ. (A.10)
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is the error function. It holds that the first component in brackets of (A.11) is a positive





is positive for ω ∈ (0, ω
∗
) and negative for ω ∈ (ω
∗
,∞) we
show that the second component of (A.11) is decreasing from zero with the limit in minus
infinity, and that the third component initially positive and globally decreasing.

















is negative and decreasing with the limit in minus infinity to conclude that the second com-
ponent of (A.11) possesses these properties, too (since it is an increasing transformation of
(A.13)). First, we can immediately observe that lim
ω→0






















which is always negative since the maximum of
∂Γ
∂ω














Γ = −∞. (A.15)
























Clearly, the first part of (A.16) is always positive and decreasing. To show that its second






























is a decreasing function of y. This completes the proof.
16
B Comparative Statics






































































































, ∀β ∈ (1, r/α) if α > 0 and ∀β ∈ (1,∞) if α ≤ 0. Furthermore,





















































+ (β − 1).

























what completes the analysis.
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